Europe's satellite spectrum battle: will Brussels give Starlink the keys?
The EU must decide by May 2027 who controls key satellite frequencies — European operators or Starlink. The outcome will shape digital sovereignty for a decade.
One frequency band. Thirty megahertz. And behind this technical detail, a strategic choice that will define Europe’s digital autonomy for the next decade. The European Commission is preparing a decision on the future of the EU 2 GHz mobile satellite service (MSS) band — specifically the 1980-2010 MHz and 2170-2200 MHz frequencies — whose current licenses expire in May 2027. Who gets to operate them: European providers, or Starlink, the SpaceX constellation that now operates thousands of satellites in orbit and is actively seeking to expand across Europe?
This image is used for illustrative purposes only. AI generated.
At a Glance
The European Commission must decide by May 2027 whether to renew or redistribute the 2 GHz MSS licenses — a key band for direct-to-device satellite services, meaning satellite internet that works without a ground antenna.
Starlink is seeking access to these frequencies and has signaled an ambition to roll out its direct-to-cell services across Europe as early as late 2027; European operators like Eutelsat see this as an existential threat.
The EU is separately building IRIS², its own 290-satellite constellation expected to deliver initial services in 2029, with full operational capacity projected around 2030 — but the 2027 regulatory window presents an immediate choice well before Europe’s alternative is ready.
A frequency band at the center of the satellite war
The 2 GHz MSS frequencies are not a minor accounting entry in the radio spectrum ledger. They form the invisible infrastructure that allows satellites to communicate directly with mobile phones — without relying on a ground station. This “direct-to-device” technology is precisely what Starlink has been deploying through its latest satellite generation, launched in late 2024.
Back in 2009, the European Commission ran a competitive selection process and designated two operators — Inmarsat (now Viasat) and Solaris (now Echostar) — to manage these frequencies for eighteen years. Those authorizations expire in May 2027. The Commission now faces a choice: renew the existing licenses, open a new competitive selection process, or design a fresh framework that accounts for the dramatically altered balance of power between American and European players.
Starlink is seeking access to these frequencies to extend its mobile satellite services across Europe, with an ambition to deploy as early as 2027. The goal is on record: SpaceX has placed the EU 2 GHz MSS band in its European roadmap.
Brussels’ regulatory dilemma
This Commission decision is not merely technical — it carries political exposure on multiple levels.
On one hand, EU competition rules require non-discriminatory treatment of operators. Excluding Starlink on grounds of American nationality would be legally vulnerable. On the other hand, handing critical communications infrastructure to an American operator whose controlling shareholder has demonstrated a willingness to use satellite connectivity as a geopolitical tool — episodes from the war in Ukraine have raised serious questions about Starlink’s political reliability — could prove irreversible.
The EU Council formalized the concern in a May 2025 internal document: satellite connectivity, it stated, is “a cornerstone of the EU’s strategic autonomy.” Harmonized access rules and common conditions attached to spectrum authorizations could help level the playing field while supporting European constellations, whose financial viability depends on achieving global service scale.
The Commission has room to maneuver. It can structure the award conditions to favor operators that demonstrably contribute to European sovereignty — through data security standards, EU-based control centers, or participation in GOVSATCOM, the EU’s interim government satellite communications network launched in January 2026. This would amount to regulation through conditions, not exclusion — legally defensible, strategically effective.
IRIS²: a 2029 answer to a 2027 problem
Andrius Kubilius, the European Commissioner for Defense and Space — responsible for space policy within the von der Leyen Commission — was direct in January 2026: IRIS², the 290-satellite constellation the EU is building as a Starlink alternative, is expected to deliver initial services in 2029, with full operational capacity projected around 2030. When complete, it should provide an encrypted communications backbone for governments and high-speed connectivity for European citizens.
But even 2029 initial services arrive two years after the MSS 2 GHz deadline. To bridge the gap, the EU launched GOVSATCOM in January 2026 — a precursor network linking eight satellites from five member states to provide communications services to the governments and militaries of all 27 EU countries. Kubilius acknowledged the trade-off: GOVSATCOM’s capacity falls short of what IRIS² will eventually offer, but Europe will not be left with “zero” services in the interim.
What is at stake with the 2 GHz band is precisely that interim window. If Starlink secures these frequencies before 2027, it will gain a first-mover advantage in the European direct-to-device satellite market — a segment widely expected to become structural to mobile connectivity over the next decade.
Can Europe afford to wait?
The stakes extend well beyond the telecoms market. European dependence on American digital infrastructure has become a top-tier political issue since the Trump administration laid bare the fragility of transatlantic security commitments. Germany has committed €35 billion to space defense. France has invested approximately €717 million in Eutelsat — the French satellite operator that manages the OneWeb low-Earth-orbit constellation, currently Europe’s most credible near-term Starlink alternative — as part of a broader capital increase of approximately €1.35 billion involving several EU member states.
For an American or Canadian reader, the analogy is roughly this: imagine if Washington were deciding whether to allocate priority mobile communication frequencies to a single foreign private operator, whose owner has a history of leveraging that service for political pressure on a wartime ally. The question is not purely technological — it is about the governance of critical infrastructure.
If Brussels yields to a dominant operator, it will normalize a dependency that, in the same breath, its own commissioners describe as dangerous.
The Bottom Line
The real question this decision raises is not “Starlink yes or no?” — it is whether Europe is capable of translating into concrete regulatory action the digital sovereignty it has been proclaiming for years. A European constellation delivering initial services in 2029 means little if the frequencies that would enable its commercial scale are already locked in by an American competitor in 2027. The window is narrow. It closes in under a year.
Sources: Euronews · European Commission (digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu) · Council of the European Union · Reuters